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REPUTATION OR GOODWILL
AS A FORM OF ONLINE PROPERTY?
by
DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON*
In writing this brief note, I have managed to commit at least two academic 
“mortal sins”. However, having the opportunity to comment on the devel-
opments  of  the concept  of  property (particularly  due to the influence  of 
technological advancements), it was simply too tempting to write a few pa-
ragraphs. My first mortal sin is that I have done virtually no research, which 
of course means that: (1) it is likely my writing adds little to existing know-
ledge; (2) I am sure to have expressed ideas and concepts already expressed 
by others, without due acknowledgements; and (3) my arguments largely 
lack references to supporting materials.  My second mortal sin is that, the 
limited research I have done has involved both "Googling" and the use of 
wikipedia - both being regarded as poor methods of reliable legal research.
Having presented those "warnings to the reader", I can move on to the 
substance of my note - can reputation/goodwill appropriately be viewed as 
property? And more precisely, can a developing concept of online property 
encompass reputational property?
A sensible starting point for my note, would be to try to describe the 
concept  of  online  property.  However,  I  am  confident  that  several  other 
notes in this compilation address that issue, and I will, thus, not do so here. 
Another sensible point of departure would have been to outline what has 
been said so far in favour of recognising a category of reputational property. 
However, for the purpose of this note, it suffices to state that such a cat-
egory of property is not a novel concept. A Google search for "reputation 
property" gives  1.700  hits  (admittedly,  some of  which  relate  to  the  poor 
reputation of certain property developers).
The topic of my note is important both on a theoretical and on a practical 
level. As far as the theoretical level is concerned, it is to be noted that the in-
formation society creates a greater emphasis  on reputation and goodwill. 
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For example, those trading online are clearly dependant on their reputation 
to a much greater degree than their offline counterparts - online you simply 
do not have the same possibilities of building trust through means such as 
location, shop structure etc.  Indeed, the reputational focus is  nicely illus-
trated by e.g. eBay's system for grading traders. Put simply, buyers can rate 
the conduct of the sellers on eBay, and potential buyers can then use those 
ratings to assess the credibility/reliability of the various sellers. 
Furthermore, with a parallel world in the form of Cyberspace, our repu-
tations are being diversified. A person living in a small village, say 50 years 
ago, would typically have one single reputation - that held in the village. 
Today, however, many people have a reputation in the town they live, and 
a completely different reputation online. Indeed, many people have a range 
of reputations online. For example, in taking part in online discussion com-
munities, a person can build up a reputation that is totally unrelated to that 
the same person enjoys in a file swapping community. Similarly, the parti-
cipation in online games such as Second Life, will give a person a reputation 
unrelated to that person's offline reputation and that person's other online 
reputations. As people often protect their "real" identity online, e.g. through 
the use of pseudonyms, there is typically no connection between a person's 
various reputations.
If we are to change the concept of property so as to attach a property 
protection to online property such as a sword, chair or magic potion used in 
a online game, it is arguable that we ought to take the opportunity to also 
assess  the  possibility  of  developing  a  category  of  reputational  property. 
After all, reputational property share several key characteristics with recog-
nised forms of property. 
Reputational property can be sold and transferred. Where a person lends 
her/his reputation or goodwill to the promotion of goods or services,  e.g. 
through endorsements, she/he is in a sense selling and transferring her/his 
reputation and goodwill.  The fact that the person typically is not loosing 
anything in transferring the reputation (that is, the endorsing person's repu-
tation remains the same after the endorsement) is no different to how a di-
gital product can be transferred without the owner loosing anything - that 
is, the party selling a digital product, such as a sound or movie file, typically 
still keep her/his own copy.
Further, like other property, reputational property can be stolen. That oc-
curs e.g. where a company falsely claims that a particular person has en-
dorsed their products. In such a scenario, the company is, in a sense, steal-
ing the goodwill and reputation of  that person. The law has recognised a 
2009] D. J. B. Svantesson: Reputation or Goodwill As a Property? 189
need to address the theft of reputational property and such actions are regu-
lated e.g. through the tort of passing off.
Finally, like most other forms of property, reputational property can be 
destroyed. The typical way in which that happens is through defamation. 
The seriousness of the destruction of reputational property is  well recog-
nised. Indeed, in some cases reputational property is held in higher regard 
than physical integrity is. One such example can be seen when comparing 
the level of compensation awarded in two reasonably recent cases. At first 
instance  in Ettingshausen  v  Australian  Consolidated  Press,  the  plaintiff  was 
awarded  $350.000AUS  to  compensate  for  the  humiliation  of  having  his 
penis showing in a grainy picture published in a magazine (with the im-
putation that he had consented to the publication). In comparison, in a case 
where a young boy had the head of his penis cut off during a circumcision, 
the  plaintiff  was  only  awarded $275.000AUS -  i.e.  $75.000AUS less  than 
what was awarded in  the  Ettingshausen case.  (Paul Reidy,  The correct  ap-
proach to defamation damages,  Communications Law Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 2 
(http://www.camla.org.au/clb/CLB%20-%20Volume%2013,%20Issue
%202.pdf)) This bizarre comparison, between reputational property and the 
type  of  property  most  men would  value  amongst  their  most  treasured, 
shows  the  tremendous  importance  that  the  law  attaches  to  reputational 
property. It also begs the question of why the law attaches that level of im-
portance to one's reputation. As far as western cultures are concerned, my 
Google search revealed one possible reason. On a website dedicatd to "the 
Immaculate Heart of Mary", I found a document stating that: "St. Thomas, 
in attempting to measure the comparative malice of the sin of detraction, 
decides  that whilst  it  is  less than homicide  or adultery it  is  greater than 
theft. This, because amongst all our external possessions a good name holds 
the  primacy."  (Reputation  (as  Property) http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/
12776c.htm) Christian morals have strongly influenced western law (a fact 
that often is overlooked when westerners analyse other legal traditions) and 
it seems likely that such morals have guided the western approach to de-
famation law. At the same time, it is to be noted that attaching strong signi-
ficance to reputational property is not a characteristic solely associated with 
western legal tradition.
When discussing whether a developing concept of online property can 
encompass reputational property, it is worthwhile to mention how reputa-
tional  property  can  compete,  and interact,  with  more  tradition  property 
concepts. In a discussion of the different property rights that are associated 
with open source software, as  opposed to traditional software licensing, it 
has been noted that in open source: "anyone can see the code, but not every-
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one can replicate the coder's influence on the community to which she con-
tributes her code. By virtue of her contribution, she builds influence in her 
chosen code community, and this influence translates into a new kind of IP: 
reputation property instead of intellectual property. [...] In this new world 
of open source, reputation property means as much as or more than tradi-
tional intellectual property. [...]  As an open source creator, then, my options 
for deriving profit from my creation are not more limited, but they are dif-
ferent. Instead of a limited monopoly guarded by law, I have a monopoly 
guarded by common sense:  buyers want to buy from the most qualified 
source of support. They pay to have access to the source: not the source 
code, but the source of the code." (Danese Cooper et  al.,  Open Source 2.0 
(O'Reilly,  2005)  (http://safari.oreilly.com/0596008023/opensources2-CHP-7-
SECT-3).  These  observations  are  relevant,  novel  and  highly  interesting. 
They make clear that current trends and developments ought to make us 
"think outside the square" when approaching traditional legal concepts such 
as the concept of property.
In light of the above, it seems that there are sound conceptual reasons to 
view reputation and goodwill as property. This is particularly so if we con-
clude that online property is to be viewed as property. At the same time, we 
must question whether viewing reputational property as a form of property 
would be beneficial on a practical level. In other words, we must ask what 
problems, if any, would be addressed by recognising reputational property 
as a category of property.
One problem area that arguably would benefit from reputational prop-
erty being recognised as property is the difficulties associated with identify-
ing a competent court and the applicable law in relation to cross-border de-
famation. Changing the mindset so as to view reputation as property might 
serve to make countries treat defamation laws less preciously. For example. 
while the Member States of the European Union has managed to reach con-
sensus as to how the applicable law should be identified in a wide range of 
property related disputes (see the  Rome Convention,  the proposed  Rome I  
Regulation and the Rome II Regulation), they have so far failed to reach con-
sensus  in  relation  to  defamation  and privacy  matters.  It  is  questionable 
whether the freedom of speech issues associated with such areas of law jus-
tify their exclusion from important instruments like the Rome II Regulation.
By saying the above, I do not mean to suggest that reputational property 
necessarily can be fitted within the current concept of property. However, 
the key argument of this paper is still valid; should there be a point in time at 
which the concept of property is re-evaluated (perhaps due to the emergence 
of online property), reputational property must be taken into consideration.
